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A. Introduction and Summary
The business of building satellites and space systems has matured. Few missions require, or can
afford, excellent performance at any price. The new paradigm is doing more with less, providing
quality systems at lower cost n in other words, doing our job "FasterBetterCheaper."
The TRW Spacecraft COst REduction (SCORE) initiative was launched in 1990 by
Daniel S. Goldin, then general manager of TRW's Space & Technology Group. The SCORE
mission is to apply continuous improvement (CI) techniques to effect major reductions in the cost
(our primary goal) and span time (as a corollary) required for the production of spacecraft.
SCORE is a multiyear initiative that is having a profound effect on both procedural and cultural
aspects of how we do business. And the objectives of this initiative are being realized.
The focus of this paper is not on the results of SCORE per se, but rather on the things we have
£
learned about how to do continuous improvement on a massive scale, with multilevel (hierarchical)
CI teams. The following sections summarize the chronology of the SCORE initiative, from team
: formation to development of the year-end report for 1991. Lessons learned, the core of this
presentation, are discussed -- with particular focus on the unique aspects of SCORE.
The SCORE initiative is continuing and, as a part of our evolving culture, will never end. It has
resulted in profound insights into the way we do work and (the topic at hand) how to do CI for
large and complex multidisciplinary development activities.
B. SCORE TQM/CI Process Chronology
B.1. Team Selection and Formation
The SCORE team was a natural progression from the CI efforts started in 1989 by a number of
"grass roots" teams in our operating divisions. Teams were formed in small work areas to look at
local processes and determine how they could be improved. These teams were largely unfunded,
meeting during lunch hour or after work. One of the recurrent frustrations in these early efforts
was that when a team got to the boundary of its functional specialty, the participants had difficulty
determining how their processes interacted with those of other areas. SCORE was conceived to
bridge this gap.
The concept of SCORE is to employ a senior cross-functional team to look into all aspects of the
process of designing, fabricating, assembling, and testing a generic spacecraft bus. The scope of
the effort encompasses a bus project from authority to proceed (ATP) through launch of the first
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satellite. Comprised of representatives from each of the organizations of Space & Technology
Group involved in the processes under study, the team was formed in December 1990. Members
were appointed by skill center managers from the Applied Technology Division (propulsion design
and hhrdware),_Engineering & Test Division (bus hardware design and spacecraft assembly/test),
Electronic Systems Group Manufacturing Division, and the Space & Technology Group
subcontracts and product assurance functions. Each member reported directly to the nominating
manager and, in SCORE matters, spoke with his voice. All disciplines involved in the production
of a spacecraft were represented:
Program management
Business and administration
Mechanical engineering
Control, sensors, and mechanisms
Power systems and integration
Spacecraft electronic systems
Propulsion
Manufacturing (including parts, materials, and processes)
Propulsion
Assembly, test, and launch
Mechanical ground systems and environmental test
Systems engineering
Subcontracts
Product integrity (quality assurance, reliability, producibility, maintainability, etc.)
To assist in helping this large group interact effectively and function as a team instead of a
committee, we included a full-time facilitator. The facilitator's tasks were to observe rather than
participate in the team's activities, provide training in team techniques as needed, and make sure
that we followed the rules we set.
It was evident from the beginning that the team needed to establish norms of behavior, rules, and
an operating philosophy. We jointly developed a set of rules, agreed to follow them, and posted
the list prominently in the meeting room. As we progressed through 1991, we found that adhering
to theserules helped _igh_canfly in ac_Sex_in-g-gehialne teamwork. For exampqe, theruieS _and
operatingphilosophy require that teamdecisions be reached byconsensus, not by simple majority.
Decision by consensus promotes ownership by each team member. The rules further require that
decisions be based upon data; this guideline helps members focus on process, not personal
prejudice or emotion.
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B.2. Team Training
Each of the team members had individually participated in our CPI ® Boot Camp, an orientation to
the principles of process improvement, but there was no group training prior to team formation.
To get us started, we were trained in the techniques of defining the "as-is," "could-be," and
"should-be" process flows, then determining barriers to implementation. As the team progressed,
we received "just-in-time" training specific to the task at hand. While generally following a classic
process improvement flow, we did deviate when it made sense. For instance, some teams
approach the "as-is" step by constructing a flow chart of every process involved to the lowest level
of detail before further analysis. Because were trying to determine which processes had the
greatest impact on the overall spacecraft process, we decided to define each process only in enough
detail to be able to understand its impact on the whole.
B.3, Methodology Selected
The SCORE team employed a variety ofTQM/CI t-ools and techniques in 1991, during a process
that was largely one of discovery. We were determined to be driven by data instead of opinions.
This commitment, coupled with the complex nature of modem spacecraft, led us to a hierarchical
three-level teaming approach -- and the use of a variety of tools, some quite successful and some
less so.
Process Flows and Maps
Our ftrst effort to define the total problem was based on detailed process flows. The SCORE team
attempted to construct a comprehensive, detailed, cross-functional spacecraft process flow on a
large wall (approximately 8 by 35 It). After consuming several hours over a couple of meetings, it
was apparent that this approach was futile. We concluded that another methodology was required.
. ,7
Definition of Levels
Spacecraft development is by nature a multilevel process. We decided to emulate this hierarchy.
Level 1 was defined as the total program, divided into time spans associated with major review
milestones (e.g., ATP to PDR, PDR to CDR, etc.). The SCORE team became the Level 1 team.
Level 2 was defined in accordance with major spacecraft development processes: requirements to
design; mechanical design through manufacturing; electrical design through manufacturing;
propulsion through manufacturing; assembly, integration, and test through on-orbit checkout;
subcontracts; and program management. Level 3 was defined as the unit level.
Seven key teams were formed (Figure 1) to address Level 2 processes. Each of these teams
validated the Level 1 flow developed by SCORE, and developed Level 2 process flows, defining
Level 3 subteams where they were needed (primarily in the design-through-manufacturing teams).
Ultimately, the seven key teams formed 38 unit-level teams involving more than 250 employees.
All teams were cross-functional, with representatives from systems engineering, subsystem
*CPI is a registered trademark of Tatham Process Engineering Inc.
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engineering, engineering specialties, design, integration and test, manufacturing, and
subcontracts -- as deemed appropriate by the Level 1 team.
Data-Driven Approach
The Level 2 teams defined process flows for the activities they addressed, with support from the
related subteams. These flow diagrams (process definitions) were used to focus the collection of
"as-is" data from selected existing and completed programs. The primary data collected and
analyzed were cost (or man-hours of labor) and span time. Often it was necessary to modify the
flows to better match the structure of data available from the programs. The quality (detail,
documentation, definition, completeness) Of data from the prb_s Was a major hindrance,
particularly when dealing with the "intellectual" phases of the programs (such as system
engineering).
Selecting High-Leverage Processes
The need to focus on those processes having the highest leverage was apparent from the
beginning. Our main tool in defining leverage was the Pareto diagram, with "as-is" cost the
parameter addressed. This approach was applied with good success for those processes (design,
integration and test, manufacturing) where the program data was relatively high in quality.
Pareto diagrams were less successful for the requirements-to-design (RTD) processes.
Discussions in Level 1 team meetings, supplemented by more formal techniques (Ishikawa
diagrams coupled with multi-voting) made it apparent that many of the downstream (e.g., design)
problems were related to the quality of RTD work-- and that simply reducing the cost of RTD
work could well lead to a higher t&al program cost. This investigation led to the definition of a
major 1992 initiative focusing on the Integrated Development Process (IDP).
Developing "Could-Be" and "Should-Be" Processes
"Could-be" processes were developed first, and were defined as the best processes possible
without constraints related to organization, facilities, etc.; in effect, the could-be processes
represent a long-term goal. The "should-be" processes were less ambitious and reMizable in the
near-term environment, in some cases, the could-be and should-be processes were very close in
terms of the key cost metric; in a few they were not. The should-be processes were used to define
attainable cost reductions, in terms of continuous improvement (CI) factors.
B.4. Summary of Results
We collected data on 553 "as-is" processes and combined them into 383 processes for analysis.
Through a combination of Pareto analysis and brainstorming, we identified high-leverage
processes and performed cause-effect analyses fip-0nthem. We defined "should-be's" for 107 of
the 383 processes and developed 112 specific recommendations for improvement.
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C. SCORE Lessons Learned
C.1. Team Composition and Commitment
Team members were nominated by their skill center managers. The main selection criteria were a
good knowledge of the work area and a desire to contribute to a process improvement effort. In
general, those nominated volunteered for the assignment. Each team member was asked to commit
a minimum of 16 hours a week to the SCORE effort and to agree to attend all of the SCORE
meetings.
C.2. Meeting Frequency and Timing
We started with two 8-hour meetings per week_ We quickly found that no more than 4 to 5 hours
of that time were productive, and there was no time left for members to follow up on action items
outside the meeting. After experimenting a bit, we settled on two 4-hour meetings a week. That
seemed to be a good compromise and was our schedule for most of the year. As the Level 2 and 3
team activities expanded, the core team meetings were cut to 2 hours twice a week, then to one 2-
hour weekly meeting. When special issues arose, the meeting time was expanded to accommodate
the need.
C.3. Team Leadership and Culture
Leadership
Leading a team such as SCORE is different from managing a project. The members are expected
to interact differently in a team setting. In a project setting there is a clear hierarchy understood by
all; in a team setting, members are expected to contribute equally and to have their ideas considered
equally without regard for rank, status, or position.
Ideally, the leader acts as a coach. He must make sure that the group operates as a team rather than
as a committee so that each member has a personal commitment to the result. For each problem
encountered or issue addressed, the team must come up with its own answer. If the leader defines
too detailed a plan for resolution, the members will fill in the blanks but not own the result. The
leader also must be very careful to keep personal prejudices and preconceived solutions out of the
process. To own the result, the team must develop it themselves.
To get the maximum benefit from a process improvement team, one must set a dramatic goal as a
challenge to creativity. Small (10 to 20 percent) improvements can usually be accomplished easily
within the existing process framework. To achieve true breakthrough improvements (40 to 70
percent), the goal must be seemingly unattainable. The leader must develop a personal vision of
the goal and continually assert that it can be accomplished, then lead/nudge the team in the direction
of the goal.
Requiring that decisions on team activities be made by consensus seems at first to be abominably
inefficient. Nonetheless, the object is to have all of the team members fully involved in decisions
so that they can support the result with one voice. Therefore, discussions must be continued until
everyone can agree or not strongly disagree with the result.
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It is imperative to have a clearly defined mission statement to focus upon, otherwise there is a
tendency to wander. The statement need not be elaborate but must be sufficiently clear that you can
tell when you have accomplished it. The sCORE mission statement, for example, is short and to
the point:
The study is directed at a generic spacecraft flow.
Define the "as-is" process flow (including cycle times) from authorization to proceed
through on-orbit customer selloff.
Determine high-leverage processes to investigate further. Develop a "should-be" overall
process flow (including cycle times) applicable to a broad range of spacecrafts projects to:
reduce cost and cycle time dramatically while maintaining or improving quality.
It proved to be equally important to develop a set of meeting rules and require strict adherence to
them. We had a practice from the beginning of developing a written agenda for the next meeting as
one of the last items of business in every meeting. That was useful, but what we found was that
we tended to belabor the earlier items and never get through the entire agenda. When we began to
set a time limit for each agenda item, the situation improved somewhat. Finally, when we rigidly
enforced the time limits even to the point of interrupting conversations in mid-word, we achieved
our highest meeting effectiveness scores. It seems that the stress caused by dictatorially ending
discussion was more than offset by the sense of accomplishment achieved by addressing all of the
agenda items.
Meeting effectiveness was measured for each meeting, then plotted and displayed in the meeting
room. The measurement technique is simple and can be applied to any sort of meeting. At the end
of the meeting, using a scale from 1 to 10, each member rates the Efficiency (how well the conduct
of the meeting followed the rules) and the Importance (how important the meeting content is to
him). All the E and I scores are averaged and multiPlied together to produce an Effectiveness
number. The Effectiveness can be dol]adzed to provide a measure of the "cost of lost opportunity"
by subtracting the Effectiveness score from 1, then multiplying by the number of attendees, the
length of the meeting, and an average cost per unit time for the attendeesl It was interesting to note
that the highest scores were achieved when the rules were most rigidly observed. It is therefore up
to the leader to enforce the rules developed and adopted by the team. Demand excellence but
realize that it can take many forms, and realize that schedule pressure to produce "something"
offends the purist but results in helping to end "analysis paralysis."
Cultural Aspects _'
We discovered early on that we are event (schedule) oriented, not process oriented. Furthermore,
the detailed examples usually given of a CI process are oriented toward short processes that repeat
frequently, such as forms handling and high-rate manufacturing. It was difficult to relate these
examples to the processes of requirements definition and detailed design. We ultimately settled
upon a format for depicting our requirements and design processes in terms of a list of inputs,
functions performed upon them, and a list of outputs. We are still inventing a way of viewing a
lengthy spacecraft program in a process context.
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The form, format, and conduct of the meeting are subtly critical to the outcome. There is a
tendency for the meeting to become a project review where the leader, not the rest of the team, is
presented with the pieces and expected to do the synthesis and make the final decision. We found
this to be true after we launched the seven key teams mentioned above. Since all of the core team
members could not attend every key team meeting, we added a "Key Team Leader Report" to the
standing agenda. Each team leader was asked to share the progress of his team with the core team
and was allocated a maximum of 5 minutes to do so. Within eight meetings, this agenda item
became a de facto project review -- with each team leader addressing the SCORE team leader, not
the team, and feeling compelled to fill his time allocation whether or not he had anything to report.
This behavior persisted even after I called attention to it numerous times. We solved the problem
by eliminating the reporting agenda item and substituting one called "Issues." If a team leader had
something to report to the team, he was required to write it on a white board before the meeting
started. When we got to the issues item, we would vote on whether to address a given issue and
set a time limit for its discussion.
While generating a process flow or map, there is a strong tendency to focus on fixing individual
problems immediately and to lose focus on the bigger picture. Giving in to this tendency leads to a
"tiger team" approach and the effort falters. Our solution was to set aside a wall area in the meeting
room and label it the "Should-Be Parking Lot." As individual problems or non-value-added
processes were found, they were listed on the parking lot to be addressed later when we
progressed to the "should-be" development phase.
In analyzing the "as-is" and developing improvements, there was a general perception that most of
the barriers to performance are external to one's own area. Forcing the teams to be cross-
functional helped to mitigate that perception. It also helped overcome the fact that we have
organized ourselves into such narrowly defined specialities that it's hard for an individual to
identify how his or her actions affect the final product.
Having a few "nay-sayers" in the group improves the process by challenging the rest of the team.
Nay-saying is often a way of talking out and defining a problem more clearly -- or at least defining
the barriers to solution.
A feeling of empowerment in the team members is developed by action and example, not by
decree. It comes slowly and is the result of experiencing favorable response to success and
tolerance of failure.
C.4. Implications of Multiple Levels (Key Teams and Subteams)
SCORE was unique in that it became a hierarchy of teams. The original concept was of a single
team, but as we developed the Level 1 flow, it became apparent that more teams would be needed.
With nearly 400 processes identified in the Level 1 flow, we formed seven key teams to study
them in detail. The key team leaders were selected from the SCORE core team. Each of the teams
was required to have cross-functional representation appropriate to its area of investigation. The
task of the key teams was to validate the Level I flow developed by SCORE and define in more
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detail the processes defined at Level 1. As the key teams formed and developed Level 2 process
flows, they also found they had to create additional teams.
In all, 38 unit or Level 3 teams were formed. As with the key teams, each unit team was required
to have cross-functional representation. The unit.level teams studied the lowest level of detail in a
process, usually involving one work area, and provided a natural conduit for grass roots team
results to be considered in the context of the entire enterprise.
The role of the core team changed as the additional teams were formed. We generated the Level 1
flow as a team then changed into essentially a steering committee for the lower level teams, then
became a team again to synthesize the results of the other teams.
C.5. Tools and Techniques
As mentioned above, we tried a variety of tools and techniques with varying degrees of success.
We set out to construct the Level 1 flow as a classic flow chart and failed twice. Then we tried to
construct an N 2 chart and failed. On the fourth attempt, we divided the task vertically into time
slices defined by major program events, and horizontally by discipline or where work is
performed. This time we succeeded and defined nearly 400 processes for further study. Figure 2
shows an outline of the Level 1 flow. Within the horizontal lines, each team member constructed a
flow of his work area as that discipline viewed it. Interfaces between disciplines were represented
by connecting the source and destination points. Along the timeline, some events were put in
quotation marks (e.g., "PDR") to signify our awareness that when the program conducts a formal
Preliminary Design Review, not all disciplines have reached the Same level of design maturity. We
used "PDR" to indicate a state of completion consistent with the classic definition of PDR.
The Level 2 teams had difficulty with detailed flow charting as well. They developed a technique
of defining a process in terms of inputs, operations performed on the inputs, and outputs. This
method provided sufficient insight into the macro process to identify areas with the most leverage.
The Electrical Design through Manufacturing key team discovered a significant benefit from this
approach. When they began, they formed unit teams to study processes related to 16 different
products. They were convinced that the products were unique and therefore the processes must be
unique as well. When they reviewed the flows produced by the 16 unit teams, they discovered that
the processes used to develop the 16 different products could be described by only seven different
process flows!
C.6. Networking with Other CI Activities
We made a conscious effort to learn from the experiences Of other (21 teams. Several of the
SCORE team were members of other teams in TRW Space & Technology Group and Electronic
Systems Group and were able to bring "lessons learned" to our meetings. In spite of the good
intentions of all concerned, however, we found that usually we didn't really understand until we
had made the same mistake ourselves.
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C.7. Follow-up: Acting on the Findings in a Continuous
Improvement Environment
For 1992, SCORE has begun to implement the suggestions derived from the 1991 work. We are
sponsoring 16 implementation initiatives that touch most of the work areas. The large_ of these
efforts is the Integrated Developed Process (IDP) team, whose task is to define an IDP in our work
environment that will result in a high level of design maturity and a physical configuration freeze at
PDR.
Our future plan is to implement new processes as opportunities occur and continue cause-effect
analysis of additional processes. We will analyze the effect of the new or changed processes on
the overall Level 1 flow and iterate until the goal is met.
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Figure 1. Seven Key Teams Addressed Level 2 Processes
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Figure 2. Top-Level Process Flow Mapped Work
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